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Abstract
A data intermediary acquires signals from individual consumers regarding their
preferences. The intermediary resells the information in a product market wherein
firms and consumers tailor their choices to the demand data. The social dimension of
the individual data– whereby a consumer’s data are predictive of others’behavior–
generates a data externality that can reduce the intermediary’s cost of acquiring the
information. The intermediary optimally preserves the privacy of consumers’identities
if and only if doing so increases social surplus. This policy enables the intermediary to
capture the total value of the information as the number of consumers becomes large.
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1 Introduction
Individual and Social Data The rise of large digital platforms– such as Facebook,
Google, and Amazon in the US and JD, Tencent and Alibaba in China– has led to the
unprecedented collection and commercial use of individual data. The steadily increasing
user bases of these platforms generate massive amounts of data about individual consumers,
including their preferences, locations, friends, and political views. In turn, many of the ser-
vices provided by large Internet platforms rely critically on these data. The availability of
individual-level data permits refined search results, personalized product recommendations,
informative ratings, timely traffi c data, and targeted advertisements.
The recent disclosures on the use and misuse of social data by digital platforms have
prompted regulators to limit the largely unsupervised use of individual data by these com-
panies. As a result, nearly all proposed and enacted regulation to date aims to ensure that
consumers retain control over their data. However, the digital privacy paradox (e.g., Athey,
Catalini, and Tucker (2017)) indicates that even small monetary incentives may lead indi-
viduals to relinquish their private data. The low cost of acquiring private data—seemingly at
odds with consumers’stated preferences over their privacy—drives the appetite of platforms
to gather information and may undermine the effi cacy of regulation.1
This article suggests a unified explanation for the digital privacy paradox and the selective
use of data for price and product choices. A key observation is that individual data are
actually social data: data captured from an individual user are informative not only about
that user but also about other users with similar characteristics or behaviors. The social
dimension of the data generates a data externality, the sign and magnitude of which depend
on the structure of the data and on the use of the gained information.
Many digital platforms use social data to increase the value provided by their services.
Google search results, for example, are informed by the choices of previous users. Indeed,
the search engine is only successful because it mediates information among many consumers.
Likewise, Amazon uses data collected from other consumers to curate a “recommended for
you” list of products and explicitly suggests goods that are “frequently bought together.”
Finally, YouTube and Waze tailor their suggestions of videos and traffi c directions to each
user’s preferences, as estimated by combining network data and individual data. However,
social data also facilitates surplus extraction, e.g., individual shopping data convey informa-
tion about the willingness to pay of consumers with similar purchase histories.
1The recent report by Furman, Coyle, Fletcher, McAules, and Marsden (2019) identifies “the central
importance of data as a driver of concentration and a barrier to competition in digital markets”– a theme
echoed in the reports by Cremèr, de Montjoye, and Schweitzer (2019) and by the Stigler Committee on
Digital Platforms (2019).
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We analyze three critical aspects of the economics of social data. First, we consider
how the collection and transmission of individual data change the terms of trade among
consumers, firms (e.g., advertisers), and data intermediaries (e.g., large Internet platforms
that sell targeted advertising space). Second, we examine how the social dimension of the
data magnifies the value of individual data for platforms and facilitates the acquisition of
large datasets. Third, we analyze how data intermediaries with market power manipulate the
trade-offs induced by social data through the aggregation and the precision of the information
that they provide about consumers.
A Model of Data Intermediation We develop a framework to evaluate the flow and
allocation of individual data in the presence of data externalities. Our model focuses on
three types of economic agents: consumers, firms, and data intermediaries. These agents
interact in two distinct but linked markets: a data market and a product market.
In the product market, each consumer (she) determines the quantity that she wishes to
purchase, and a single producer (he) sets the unit price at which he offers a product to the
consumers. Initially, each consumer has private information about her willingness to pay for
the firm’s product. This information consists of a signal with two additive components: a
fundamental component and a noise component. The fundamental component represents
her willingness to pay, and the noise component reflects that her initial information might
be imperfect. Both components can be correlated across consumers: in practice, different
consumers’preferences can exhibit common traits, and consumers might undergo similar
experiences that induce correlation in their errors.
In the data market, a monopolist intermediary acquires demand information from the
individual consumers in exchange for a monetary payment. The intermediary then chooses
how much information to share with the other consumers and how much information to
sell to the producer. Sharing data with consumers allows them to tailor their demand to
their true preferences. Sharing data with the producer enables more tailored and possibly
personalized prices.
We introduce a rich model for the structure of individual data, which allows for correlation
in the fundamentals as well as in the noise terms across the individuals. We view this richness
in the data structure as the defining element of data in digital platforms. In contrast, we
adopt a more specific model for product market interaction whereby a monopolist seller
charges linear prices for variable quantity. However, our main insights apply to any product
market where (a) data sharing teaches consumers about their preferences, and (b) a firm
seeks to extract the consumers’surplus.2
2In fact, the value of social data in Section 3 can be computed for alternative specification of the product
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The Value of Social Data Collecting data from multiple consumers helps any market
participant to filter the individual signals. This process can occur through two channels.
First, in a market where the noise terms are largely idiosyncratic, a large sample size filters
out errors and identifies any common fundamentals. Second, in a market with largely idio-
syncratic fundamentals, many observations filter out demand shocks and identify common
noise terms, thereby estimating individual fundamentals by differencing (Proposition 1).
However, the choice by each consumer to share her data with the intermediary is guided
only by her private benefits and costs, not by the information gains she generates with her
actions. Thus, the intermediary must compensate each individual consumer only to the
extent that the disclosed information affects her own welfare on the margin. Critically, the
platform does not have to compensate the individual consumer for any changes in her welfare
caused by the information deduced from other consumers’signals.
Therefore, social data drive a wedge between the socially effi cient and profitable uses
of information. First, the cost of acquiring individual data can be substantially less than
the value of the information to the platform. Second, although many uses of consumer
information exhibit positive externalities, very little prevents the platform from trading data
for profitable uses that are in fact harmful to consumers (Proposition 2).3
More generally, the data externality can induce too much or too little trade in data. In-
deed, the condition for data intermediation to yield positive profits is qualitatively different
from the condition for intermediation to yield social welfare gains. In particular, the inter-
mediary obtains positive profits when a large number of consumers exhibit a strong degree of
correlation in their preferences: this allows the intermediary to acquire the consumers’data
in exchange for minimal compensation. On the other hand, welfare improvements depend on
how much additional information each consumer can obtain about her own preferences from
the other consumers’ signals. Therefore, when many consumers have strongly correlated
preferences and very precise signals, data sharing is detrimental to welfare but profitable to
the intermediary. Conversely, there are data structures (e.g., ones with independent funda-
mentals and strongly correlated error terms) for which data sharing is beneficial to consumers
but unprofitable for the data intermediary.
market and a general result for anonymization is obtained in Section 4. Finally in Section 5, we consider
a richer environment where a merchant offers different varieties to consumers with heterogeneous tastes for
his products. In that case, the firm’s actions both generate value and attempt to capture it.
3Recent empirical work on the effects of privacy regulation such as the European Union’s General Data
Protection Regulation (e.g., Aridor, Che, and Salz (2020) and Johnson, Shriver, and Goldberg (2020)),
indicates that data externalities are relevant for consumers’and businesses’decisions to share their data.
In the United States, legislators are also increasingly aware of the consequences of data externalities. In
particular, the US House Committee on the Judiciary (2020) reports that “[...] the social data gathered
through [a platform’s] services may exceed their economic value to consumers.”
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Equilibrium Data-Sharing Policies A natural question is then whether the data market
imposes any limitations at all on equilibrium information sharing. To shed light on this
issue, we consider the choice of whether to reveal the consumers’identities to the producer
or to collect anonymous data. When consumers are homogeneous ex ante, we show that
the intermediary collects anonymous data if and only if the transmission of identity data
reduces total surplus. Therefore, even if the data transmission may be socially detrimental,
the optimal choice of data anonymization is socially effi cient (Proposition 3).
In our model of linear price discrimination, collecting anonymous data amounts to selling
aggregate, market-level information to the producer. With this choice, the intermediary does
not enable the producer to set personalized prices: the data are transmitted but disconnected
from the users’personal profiles. In other words, the role of social data provides a more
nuanced ability to determine the modality of information acquisition and use.
Under anonymized data intermediation, the gap between the social value of the data
and the price of the data widens when the number of consumers increases. In particular, as
the sources of data multiply, the contribution of each individual consumer to the aggregate
information shrinks, which drives down the individual payments to consumers, and possibly
the total payment as well (Proposition 5).
We develop a general anonymization result (Proposition 8) and extend the model in
several directions. We first introduce consumer heterogeneity by considering multiple groups
of consumers. We find that the intermediary aggregates the data at least to the level of the
coarsest partition of homogeneous consumers, although further aggregation is profitable when
the number of consumers is small. The resulting group pricing– discriminatory pricing based
on observable characteristics, such as location– has welfare consequences between those of
complete privacy and those of price personalization (Proposition 9).
We then consider a model in which the producer can choose prices and product character-
istics to match an additional horizontal (taste) dimension of the consumers’preferences. The
resulting data policy then aggregates the vertical dimension but not the horizontal dimen-
sion, thereby enabling the producer to offer personalized product recommendations but not
personalized prices (Proposition 10). Finally, in the Online Appendix, we explore the data
intermediary’s ability to offer privacy guarantees by collecting less than perfect information
about the consumers’signals.
Implications and Applications There exist a wide variety of data intermediaries and
associated business models. The point of our article is not to try to match any specific
business model but rather to speak to the general principles that seem to be in effect in many
markets. In particular, our model assumes that each consumer is compensated directly with
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a monetary transfer for her individual data. There exist a few concrete examples of such
transactions (e.g., Nielsen offers monetary rewards to consumers for access to their browsing
and purchasing data). However, most data intermediaries compensate their users via the
quality of the services they offer, e.g., social networks, search, mail, video. These services
are nominally free, but in practice (through more or less transparent terms and conditions)
they are fueled by the data generated by their users.
Likewise, digital platforms occasionally transfer consumers’data to merchants for a fee.
Much more often, however, they monetize their data by selling access to targeted advertising
campaigns– see the report by the Competition &Markets Authority (2020). This enables the
merchants to reap the value of information, by conditioning their messages and their prices
on the consumers’preferences, without directly observing their data. These transactions
amount to indirect sales of information, as discussed in Bergemann and Bonatti (2019).
Our model’s predictions for the nature of the externality, for the equilibrium allocation
of data, and for its welfare properties then depend on how targeted advertising affects to-
tal surplus in any given market. Specifically, if advertising generates value by matching of
buyers and sellers, as in Bergemann and Bonatti (2011), our model would predict the in-
termediation of individual-level information through very detailed targeting categories. If,
instead, targeted advertisements facilitate ineffi cient price discrimination, the model would
predict coarser targeting categories that induce market-level or group-level pricing.
Related Literature This article contributes to the growing literature on data markets
recently surveyed in Bergemann and Bonatti (2019). In particular, the role of data exter-
nalities in the socially excessive diffusion of personal data has been a central concern in
Choi, Jeon, and Kim (2019) and Acemoglu, Makhdoumi, Malekian, and Ozdaglar (2021),
both considering a model with many buyers and one firm that acts as an integrated data
intermediary and seller.
Choi, Jeon, and Kim (2019) introduce information externalities into a model of monopoly
pricing with unit demand. Each consumer is described by two independent random variables:
her willingness to pay for the monopolist’s service and her sensitivity to a loss of privacy.
The purchase of the service by the consumer requires the transmission of personal data.
From the collected data, the seller gains additional revenue, depending on the proportion of
units sold and the volume of data collected. The total nuisance cost paid by each consumer
depends on the total number of consumers sharing their personal data. Thus, the optimal
pricing policy of the monopolist yields excessive loss of privacy, relative to the social welfare
maximizing policy.
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Acemoglu, Makhdoumi, Malekian, and Ozdaglar (2021) also analyze data acquisition in
the presence of information externalities. As in Choi, Jeon, and Kim (2019), they consider
a model with many consumers and a single data-acquiring firm. Like the current analysis,
Acemoglu, Makhdoumi, Malekian, and Ozdaglar (2021) propose an explicit statistical model
for their data; the model allows the authors to assess the loss of privacy for the consumer and
the gains in prediction accuracy for the firm. Their analysis then pursues a different, and
largely complementary, direction from ours. In particular, they analyze how consumers with
heterogeneous privacy concerns trade information with a data platform and derive conditions
under which the equilibrium allocation of information is (in)effi cient.
In contrast to these two important contributions, we explicitly introduce a data interme-
diary with objectives distinct from either the consumers or the seller. We consider rich data
structures for fundamentals and noise terms that capture the wide range of social data on
digital platforms. This allows us to endogenize privacy concerns and to quantify the down-
stream welfare impact of data intermediation. In addition, we can investigate when and how
privacy can be partially or fully preserved through aggregation, anonymization, and noise.
Thus, we augment the analysis in the above contributions with additional insights regarding
data flows and data intermediation. In particular, we show that the data externality can
have a positive or a negative impact on consumer and social surplus depending on the data
structure. In consequence, a monopolist intermediary can induce either too little or too
much information sharing in equilibrium.
Acquisti, Taylor, and Wagman (2016) survey the literature on the economics of privacy
in great detail. An early and influential article is Taylor (2004), who analyzes the sales of
consumer purchase histories without data externalities. More recently, Cummings, Ligett,
Pai, and Roth (2016) investigate how privacy policies affect user and advertiser behavior in
a simple model of targeted advertising. The low level of compensation that users command
for their personal data is discussed in Arrieta-Ibarra, Goff, Jimenez-Hernandez, Lanier, and
Weyl (2018), who propose sources of countervailing market power, and in a growing body of
empirical work. In particular, Tang (2019) uses large-scale field experiments to estimate the
value that online borrowers assign to several pieces of personal data. Lin (2019) separates
intrinsic and instrumental preferences for privacy through a lab experiment that also uncovers
data externalities.
Fainmesser, Galeotti, and Momot (2020) provide a digital privacy model in which data
collection improves the service provided to consumers. However, as the collected data can
also leak to third parties and thus impose privacy costs, an optimal digital privacy policy
must be established. Similarly, Jullien, Lefouili, and Riordan (2020) analyze the equilibrium
privacy policy of websites that monetize information collected from users by charging third
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parties for targeted access. Gradwohl (2017) considers a network game in which the level
of beneficial information sharing among the players is limited by the possibility of leakage
and a decrease in informational interdependence. Ali, Lewis, and Vasserman (2019) study
a model of personalized pricing with disclosure by an informed consumer, and they analyze
how different disclosure policies affect consumer surplus. Ichihashi (2020b) studies both
personalized pricing and product recommendations, and shows that a seller benefits from
committing not to use the consumer’s information to set prices. Our result on optimal
anonymization and market-level pricing has similar implications, but is entirely driven by
the data externality that appears when multiple consumers are present.
Finally, Liang and Madsen (2020) investigate how data policies can provide incentives in
principal-agent relationships. They emphasize the structure of individual data and how the
substitutes or complements nature of individual signals determines the impact of data on
incentives. Ichihashi (2020a) considers a single data intermediary and asks how complements
or substitutes consumer signals affect the equilibrium price of the individual data.
2 Model
We consider an idealized trading environment with many consumers, a single intermediary
in the data market, and a single producer in the product market.
2.1 Product Market
There are finitely many consumers, labeled i = 1, ..., N . In the product market, each con-
sumer (she) chooses a quantity level qi to maximize her net utility given a unit price pi
offered by the producer (he):




Each consumer i has a baseline willingness to pay for the product wi ∈ R.
The producer sets the unit price pi at which he offers his product to each consumer i.
The producer has a linear production cost
c (q) , c · q, for some c ≥ 0.
The producer’s profits are given by
π (pi, qi) ,
∑
i
(pi − c) qi.
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2.2 Data Environment
The vector of willingness to pay, w = (..., wi, ...) ∈ RN , is distributed according to a joint
distribution Fw:
w ∼ Fw. (1)
Initially, each consumer may have only imperfect information about her willingness to pay.
In particular, consumer i observes a signal
si , wi + σ · ei, (2)
where σ > 0 and ei is consumer i’s error term. The error terms e = (..., ei, ...) ∈ RN
are independent of the willingness to pay w, and they are distributed according to a joint
distribution Fe:
e ∼ Fe. (3)
We denote by S the information structure generated by the complete vector of consumer
signals s = (..., si, ...) ∈ RN . We allow for arbitrary distributions of fundamentals w and
errors e, and hence arbitrary correlation structures across consumers, under the restriction
that the (Fw, Fe) are symmetric across individuals. We view the richness in the data structure
as represented by (1) and (3) as the defining feature of social data in the digital economy. In
particular, the noise in the signal si of each individual given by (2) reflects the importance
of social learning as enabled by recommender, rating and search engines.
Without loss of generality we assume that (i) each individual willingness to pay wi has
mean µ and variance 1; (ii) individual errors ei have mean 0 and variance 1 (which is scaled
by the parameter σ).
The producer knows the structure of demand and thus the common prior distribution
of consumers’willingness to pay. However, absent any additional information, the producer
does not know the realized willingness to pay wi of any consumer (or her signal si) prior
to setting prices. This data environment has two important features. First, any demand
information beyond the common prior comes from the signals of the individual consumers.
Second, with any amount of noise in the signals (i.e., if σ > 0), each consumer can learn
more about her own demand from the signals of the other consumers.
The following leading examples illustrate two ways in which data sharing can help each
consumer learn more about her individual willingness to pay. In, Example 1 a new product
has a common value that consumers are imperfectly informed about.
Example 1 (Common Preferences)
Fundamentals wi are perfectly correlated and errors ei are independent: si = w + σ · ei.
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In this case, data sharing helps to filter out the idiosyncratic error terms: as N becomes
large, the average signal across all consumers identifies the common willingness to pay.
In Example 2, individual consumers have independent values for a new therapy but are
exposed to a common health shock.
Example 2 (Common Experience)
Errors ei are perfectly correlated, and fundamentals wi are independent: si = wi + σ · e.
Under this structure, the average signal identifies the common error component e as
N becomes large. All market participants can then precisely estimate each wi from the
difference between individual and average signal.
As we shall see, information sharing enables learning in both examples. However, the
actions of consumers −i impact the surplus of consumer i quite differently in the two cases,
which has implications for the equilibrium price of data. More generally, the data structure
will determine how to separate the individual and the aggregate information.
2.3 Data Market
The data market is run by a single data intermediary (it). As a monopolist market maker, the
data intermediary decides how to collect the available information (si) from each consumer
and how to share it with the other consumers and the producer. Thus, the data intermediary
faces both an information design problem and an information pricing problem.
We consider bilateral contracts between the individual consumers and the intermediary
and between the producer and the intermediary. The data intermediary offers these bilateral
contracts ex ante, i.e., before the realization of any demand shocks. Each bilateral contract
defines a data policy and a data price.
The data contract with consumer i specifies a data inflow policyXi and a feemi ∈ R paid
to the consumer. The data inflow policy describes how each signal si enters the database
of the intermediary. We restrict attention to the following two policies: (i) the complete
(identity-revealing) data policy X = S, where the intermediary collects each consumer’s
signal si; and (ii) the anonymized data policy X = A, where the intermediary collects
individual signals without identifying information. We model the anonymized data policy as
A : S → δ (S) ,
for a random permutation of the consumers’indices i→ δ (i). In both cases, as discussed in
Section 2.4 below, there are no further incentive constraints, i.e., consumers transmit their
information truthfully.
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In our product market model, where the consumer’s demand is linear in her signal, the
anonymized data policy A is equivalent to an aggregate data policy that conveys information
about the average willingness to pay. Intuitively, the anonymized data policy prevents the
producer from matching signals to consumers, i.e., from profitably charging personalized
prices. In Section 7, we enrich the intermediary’s strategy space by allowing for data policies
that collect partial information about the consumers’signals.
A data contract with the producer specifies a data outflow policy Y and a fee m0 ∈ R
paid by the producer. The data outflow policy determines how each consumer’s collected
signal is transmitted to the producer and to other consumers. In particular, letting X denote
the intermediary’s realized data inflow, a data outflow policy Y = (Y0, Y1, . . . YN) describes
how the collected data are released to the seller,
Y0 : X → ∆(RN),
and to each consumer,
Yi : X → ∆(RN).
Sharing data with other consumers is a critical design element because doing so allows each
consumer to adjust her quantity demanded at any price. Therefore, the information received
by consumers also impacts the producer’s willingness to pay for the intermediary’s data.
The data intermediary maximizes the net revenue




2.4 Equilibrium and Timing
The game proceeds sequentially. First, the terms of trade on the data market and then the
terms of trade on the product market are established. The timing of the game is as follows:
1. The data intermediary offers a data inflow policy (mi, Xi) to each consumer i. Con-
sumers simultaneously accept or reject the intermediary’s offer.
2. The data intermediary offers a data outflow policy (m0, Y ) to the producer, based on
the (known) number of consumers who have accepted. The producer accepts or rejects
the offer.
3. Consumers’ signals s are realized, and the information flows (x, y) are transmitted
according to the terms of the data policies.
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4. The producer sets a unit price pi for each consumer i who makes a purchase decision
qi, given her available information about wi.
We analyze the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of the game. Under the timing described
above, information is imperfect but symmetric at the contracting stage. Furthermore, when
the consumer receives the intermediary’s offer, she must anticipate the intermediary’s choice
of data outflow policy, which determines what data are shared with her, as well as with
the producer. We denote by a0, ai ∈ {0, 1} the participation decisions by the producer and
by consumer i, respectively. A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is then a tuple of inflow and
outflow data policies, data and product pricing policies, and participation decisions:
{(X∗, Y ∗,m∗) ; p∗, q∗; a∗} ,
where
a∗0 : X × Y × R→{0, 1} , a∗i : Xi × R→{0, 1} ,
such that (i) the producer maximizes his expected profits, (ii) the intermediary maximizes its
expected revenue, and (iii) each consumer maximizes her net utility. In our baseline analysis,
we focus on the best equilibrium for the data intermediary; in the best equilibrium, every
consumer accepts the offer from the data intermediary. We discuss a unique implementation
in Section 4.3.
Figure 1 summarizes the information and value flow in the data and product markets.
Figure 1: Data and Value Flows
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Discussion of Model Features
Participation Constraints The participation constraints of every consumer and of the
producer are required to hold at the ex ante level. Thus, the consumers agree to the data
policy before the realization of their signals. The choice of ex ante participation constraints
captures the prevailing conditions under which users interact with large digital platforms.
For instance, users of services on Amazon, Facebook, or Google typically establish an account
and accept the “terms of service”before making any specific query or post. Through the lens
of our model, the consumer requires a level of compensation that allows her to profitably
share the information in expectation. Upon agreeing to participate, there are no further
incentive compatibility constraints on the transmission of her information.
Lack of Commitment As we mentioned above, targeted advertising is the primary
source of revenue for digital platforms. Consequently, the data intermediary in our sequential
game sells the consumers’data only to the producer, and cannot commit to withholding any
information from him. Similarly, the intermediary’s choice of data outflow policy occurs
after consumers are enlisted but before their data are realized. This assumption captures
the limited ability of a platform to write advertising contracts contingent on, say, the volume
of activity taking place at any point in time.
Linear Price Discrimination The producer in our baseline model uses the consumers’
data to charge a unit price to each consumer. Whether richer pricing instruments enable
online merchants to implement more sophisticated forms of price discrimination is largely
an empirical question. However, as we discuss in Section 5.1, the general anonymization
result of Proposition 8 guides the intermediary’s optimal data policy even if the producer
can extract more of the surplus generated through better information. Indeed, even in the
case of perfect price discrimination, the presence of the data externality would continue to
drive a gap between equilibrium and socially effi cient allocation.
3 Value of Social Data
3.1 Data Sharing and Product Market
In our extensive form game, given the realized data inflow, the intermediary offers a data
outflow policy to the producer. This policy specifies both the fee m0 and the flow of infor-
mation to all market participants, including the consumers. The data outflow policy thus
determines both how well informed the producer is and how well informed his customers are.
Because the information is being sold to the producer, the intermediary will choose a
data outflow policy that maximizes the producer’s profits, and then extracts the value of
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this information through the feem0. The intermediary’s choice of outflow policy is simplified
considerably by the following result, which allows us to restrict attention to policies in which
every consumer is weakly better informed than the producer.
Lemma 1 (Data Outflow Policy)
For any data inflow X, it is without loss of generality to consider data outflow policies where
Y0(X) is measurable with respect to each Yi(X).
Interestingly, the result of Lemma 1 does not rely on the specific nature of the product
market interaction. The key observation is that, if the producer were better informed, the
prices charged would convey information to consumers about their own willingness to pay.
The ensuing signaling incentives impose a cost on the producer because he will need to
deviate from the prices that maximize his profits, holding fixed the consumers’beliefs. The
intermediary can then increase the producer’s profits (weakly) by revealing any information
contained in the equilibrium prices directly to the consumers. Furthermore, this improvement
is strict if, when the consumers receive this additional information, the producer modifies
his choice of price.
Under the data outflow policies of Lemma 1, we can easily quantify the value of infor-
mation for consumers and producers. The shared data help each consumer estimate her
own willingness to pay. For the producer, the shared data enable a more informed pricing
policy. In particular, given the realized data outflow y ∈ Y , the optimal pricing policy for
the producer consists of a vector of (potentially personalized) prices p∗i , thus resulting in a
vector of individual quantities q∗i purchased. We denote the predicted value of consumer i’s
willingness to pay, given the signals (si, yi) by:
ŵi (si, yi) , E [wi | si, yi] .
The realized demand of consumer i is given by
qi (si, yi, p) = ŵi (si, yi)− p.
As Y0 is (weakly) less informative than Yi, the producer chooses the optimal price
p∗i (y0) =
E[ŵi (si, yi) |Y0] + c
2
=
ŵi (y0) + c
2
,
which results in the equilibrium quantity:
q∗i (si, yi, y0) , q∗i (si, yi, p∗i (y0)) .
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The ex ante expected profit of the producer from interacting with consumer i is given by





(ŵi (y0)− c)2 |Y0
]
.
The first argument in Πi (·, ·) refers to consumer i’s information structure (Si, Yi) and the
second argument refers to the producer’s information structure Y0. Similarly, we denote the
indirect utility of consumer i as





(ŵi (si, yi)− p∗i (y0))2 |Si, Yi
]
.
3.2 Welfare Effects of Data Sharing
The model with quadratic payoffs (regardless of the prior distribution of consumers’will-
ingness to pay) yields explicit expressions for the value of information for product market
participants. In particular, because prices and quantities are linear functions of the posterior
mean ŵi, the ex ante average prices and quantities E [p∗] and E [q∗] are constant across all
information structures. Consequently, all surplus levels depend only on the ex ante variance
of the posterior mean ŵi under the consumers’and the merchant’s information structures.
We therefore quantity the players’information gains under any information structure Y
through the variance of posterior expectation:
G(Y ) , var[ŵi(y)], (5)
and refer to it as the (informational) gain function. As we normalized the variance of the
fundamental wi to 1, the gain function G(Y ) represents the fraction of the variance of wi
explained by the signal y.
We now turn to the consequences of data sharing relative to no information sharing.
Without information, the producer charges a constant price for all consumers based on the
prior mean, denoted by p̄. In contrast, the consumer already has an initial signal si, accord-
ing to which she can adjust her quantity. The producer’s net revenue and the consumer’s
expected utility under no information sharing are then given by
Πi (Si,∅) , E [π (p̄, q∗i (si))] ,
Ui (Si,∅) , E [ui (wi, q∗i (si) , p̄) |Si ] .
We can now express the value of data sharing for the consumers and the producer in
terms of the respective information gains.
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Proposition 1 (Value of Data Outflow)
1. The value of data outflow Y for the producer is
Πi ((Si, Yi) , Y0)− Πi (Si,∅) =
1
4
G (Y0) . (6)
2. The value of data outflow Y for consumer i is
Ui ((Si, Yi) , Y0)− Ui (Si,∅) =
1
2
(G (Si, Yi)−G (Si))−
3
8
G (Y0) . (7)
3. The social value of data outflow Y is
Wi ((Si, Yi) , Y0)−Wi (Si,∅) =
1
2
(G (Si, Yi)−G (Si))−
1
8
G (Y0) . (8)
Thus, consumer and social surplus increase with the additional information learned by
the consumers G (Si, Yi)−G (Si), and decrease with the information learned by the producer
G (Y0). Intuitively, the welfare consequences of data sharing operate through two channels.
First, with more information about her own preferences, the demand of each consumer is
more responsive to her willingness to pay; this responsiveness is beneficial for consumers
and (weakly) for the producer. Second, with access to better data, the producer adapts
his pricing policy to the estimate of each consumer’s willingness to pay ŵi. This price
responsiveness dampens some of the quantity responsiveness. Hence, this second channel
reduces both consumer surplus and total welfare.
Whether the first or the second channel dominates depends on the informativeness of the
consumers’initial signals G (Si), and on the degree of correlation in the fundamental and
error terms, which jointly determine any consumer’s ability to learn from others’information.
Corollary 1 formalizes this intuition by deriving the implications of Proposition 1 in several
special cases.
Corollary 1 (Welfare Effects)
1. If consumers cannot learn from each other’s signals (G (S) = G (Si)), any data sharing
reduces consumer and social surplus.
2. If individual signals si are uninformative (G (Si) = 0) any data sharing improves con-
sumer and social surplus.
3. Social surplus is maximized by collecting and sharing all signals with every consumer
(Yi = S), and sharing no data with the producer (Y0 = ∅).
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Data sharing is detrimental to consumer and social surplus when consumers observe
their willingness to pay perfectly (σ = 0), or when both fundamentals (wi, wj) and errors
(ei, ej) are independent. In those cases, any data sharing only enables price discrimination.4
Conversely, if individual signals become arbitrarily uninformative, but the entire vector s
remains informative, then even symmetric information gains (i.e., data outflow policies where
Y0 = Yi) yield Pareto improvements in the product market. In this case, the producer and the
consumer share the additional gains from trade associated with better informed consumption
and pricing decisions.
Finally, an immediate implication of the two channels highlighted by Proposition 1 is that
the first best allocation of information consists of collecting and sharing all data among the
consumers and none with the producer. However, a data intermediary with market power
will not implement the socially optimal allocation of information. In particular, because the
producer is paying for the data, he will always receive some information. To fully describe
the outcome of the game, we then turn to the price of social data.
3.3 Price of Social Data
We first derive the total paymentm0 charged to the producer and the compensationmi owed
to each consumer. For the producer, the gains from data acquisition have to at least offset
the price of the data. At the same time, the intermediary can charge up to the entire value
of the information outflow Y0 to the producer. From expression (6) in Proposition 1, we can
then write the payment m0 as
m0 (Y ) = N (Πi ((Si, Yi) , Y0)− Πi (Si,∅)) =
N
4
G (Y0) . (9)
Not surprisingly, the intermediary’s profits are increasing in the amount of information sold
to the producer. However, we also know from Lemma 1 that every consumer i receives at
least as much information as the producer. These two observations establish the optimality
of the complete data outflow policy. Under this policy, the entire realized data inflow X
is reported to the producer and to all consumers, including those who did not accept the
intermediary’s offer.
4The special case in which each consumer knows her willingness to pay (i.e., signals are noiseless in our
model’s language) is closely related to the model of third-degree price discrimination in Robinson (1933) and
Schmalensee (1981). In our setting, data sharing enables the producer to offer personalized prices; thus, price
discrimination occurs across different realizations of the willingness to pay. In contrast, in Robinson (1933)
and Schmalensee (1981), price discrimination occurs across different market segments. In both settings, the
central result is that average demand does not change (with all markets served), but social welfare is lower
under finer market segmentation.
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Lemma 2 (Optimal Data Outflow)
Given any realized data inflow X, the complete data outflow policy, Y ∗0 (X) = Y
∗
i (X) = X
for all i, maximizes the gross revenue of the producer among all feasible data-outflow policies.
A critical driver of the consumer’s decision to share data is her ability to anticipate the
intermediary’s use of the information thus gained. By Lemma 2, every consumer knows that
all product market participants will receive the same information from the intermediary.
In particular, consumer i knows that, by rejecting her contract, she prevents the producer
from accessing her data Xi, but she does not forego the opportunity to learn from other
consumers’data X−i. In other words, consumer i can learn X−i for free. In practice, this
corresponds to searching for the same content on a digital platform without “logging in”or
else agreeing to sharing her own data.
For any data inflow policy X and any underlying signal structure, the data intermediary
offers positive payments to consumers. This occurs because the intermediary must compen-
sate consumers on the margin: consumer i requires compensation for revealing her data Xi
to the producer, given that the other N − 1 consumers already share theirs.5 Therefore, the
payments satisfy
mi ≥ Ui ((Si, X−i) , X−i)− Ui ((Si, X) , X) . (10)
Intuitively, consumer i is not compensated for the (positive or negative) effect of other
consumers’data inflow X−i on her surplus. To see this more formally, suppose consumer i’s
participation constraint (10) binds, and rewrite compensation mi as
m∗i (X) = Ui ((Si, X−i) , X−i)− Ui ((Si, X) , X)
= −(Ui ((Si, X) , X)− Ui (Si,∅))︸ ︷︷ ︸
,∆Ui(X)
+ Ui ((Si, X−i) , X−i)− Ui (Si,∅)︸ ︷︷ ︸
,DEi(X)
. (11)
The first term in (11), denoted by ∆Ui (X), is the total impact on consumer i’s surplus
associated with data inflow X. The second term is the data externality (12) imposed on i
by consumers j 6= i. It reflects the change in utility when j 6= i sell their data Xj to the
intermediary who then shares the data with the producer. As it is central to our analysis,
we now examine the latter term in detail.
3.4 Data Externality and Intermediation
Our notion of data externality isolates the effect on consumer i’s surplus of the decision by
the other consumers to share their data with all market participants.
5We will revisit this property when we discuss the intermediary’s commitment power in Section 5.4.
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Definition 1 (Data Externality)
The data externality imposed by consumers −i on consumer i is given by
DEi (X) , Ui ((Si, X−i) , X−i)− Ui (Si,∅) . (12)




(G (Si, X−i)−G (Si))−
3
8
G (X−i) . (13)
To provide some intuition as to what determines the sign of the data externality, we evaluate
expression (13) under the two special information structures in Examples 1 and 2. In both
cases, we consider what would happen if consumer i held back her signal, given that the
remaining N − 1 consumers share theirs with the producer and with consumer i.
Example 1 illustrates that if consumer i does not learn much from the signals of the other
consumers, but those signals help predict wi, then the data externality is negative.
Example 1 (Common Preferences)
Let si = w+σei, and suppose the intermediary collects all consumer data, Xi = Si. The pro-
ducer can use N−1 signals to estimate the common preference parameter w, i.e., G (S−i) > 0.
If the individual signals are suffi ciently precise so that G (S) ≈ G (Si), then consumer i is
worse off when other consumers share their signals, i.e., the data externality is negative.
Example 2 illustrates that if the producer cannot learn anything about wi from signals
s−i, then the data externality is unambiguously positive.
Example 2 (Common Experience)
Let si = wi +σe, and suppose the intermediary collects all consumer data, Xi = Si. Because
all wi are independent, G (S−i) = 0, i.e., the producer cannot learn about wi from signals s−i
only. However, consumer i can use signals s−i to filter out the common error in her own
signal si, i.e., G (S) > G (Si). Therefore, other consumers’signals help consumer i, i.e., the
data externality is positive.
Thus, the overall effect of data sharing on consumer surplus (Proposition 1) depends
largely on the informativeness of individual signals si. Conversely, the impact of other
consumers’ sharing decisions varies significantly with the data structure, particularly the
ability of the producer to learn about wi from signals s−i.
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4 Optimal Data Intermediation
The data externality has direct implications for the intermediary’s profit (4). Combining the




(∆Wi (X)−DEi (X)) , (14)
where ∆W (X) denotes the effect of sharing data policy X on total surplus, as in (8). The
intermediary’s profits are equal to the effect of data sharing on social surplus, net of the
data externalities across all consumers. The sign of the data externality is therefore critical
for the profitability of data intermediation. In particular, if consumers impose negative
data externalities on each other, this imposition directly reduces the compensation owed to
each one, and conversely if the data externalities are positive. The revenue formula (14)
clarifies how the intermediary’s objective differs from the social planner’s. In particular, if
the data externality is negative, then intermediation can be profitable but welfare reducing.
Conversely, if the data externality is positive, welfare-enhancing intermediation might not
be profitable.
Having characterized the two terms ∆Ui and DEi in (7) and (13), we can rewrite the




(G (X)−G (X−i)) . (15)
Finally, combining the terms m∗0 (X) in (9) and m
∗




(3G (X−i)−G (X)) . (16)
This yields a necessary and suffi cient condition for profitable data intermediation.
Proposition 2 (Profitable Data Intermediation)
Data intermediation with inflow policy X is profitable if and only if
3G (X−i) ≥ G(X).
Proposition 2 considers the amount of information learned by the producer. Specifically,
it requires that the signals x−i generate at least 1/3 of the variance of wi explained by the
entire vector x in order for the data inflow policy X to be profitable. Intuitively, it is cheaper
to acquire each signal xi if the other consumers’signals are substitutes, and this is more
likely to occur when the underlying fundamentals wi and w−i are correlated. Conversely, for
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independent fundamentals, G (X−i) = 0 for any X, and intermediation is not profitable.
We now draw the implications for the intermediary’s profits in our two leading examples.
Corollary 2 (Common Preference)
Suppose fundamentals wi are perfectly correlated and errors ei are independent. When N is
large, data intermediation is always profitable. However, for suffi ciently small σ, the data
externality is negative, and data sharing reduces social surplus.
These results echo the findings of Acemoglu, Makhdoumi, Malekian, and Ozdaglar (2021),
who considered signals with diminishing marginal informativeness, and found socially exces-
sive data intermediation. The information structure in Corollary 2 satisfies this submodu-
larity property. In our model, however, socially insuffi cient intermediation can also occur. In
particular, the intermediary may be unable to generate positive profits from socially effi cient
information with complementary signals, such as those in Corollary 3.
Corollary 3 (Common Experience)
Suppose fundamentals wi are independent and errors ei are perfectly correlated. For suffi -
ciently large σ, data sharing increases social surplus. However, because the fundamentals are
independent, data intermediation is never profitable.
The conclusions of Corollaries 2 and 3 do not depend on whether the intermediary collects
complete data or anonymized data. However, as we discuss in the next section, it is always
optimal for the intermediary to anonymize the data collected.
4.1 Data Anonymization
We now explore the intermediary’s decision to anonymize the individual consumers’demand
data. We focus on two maximally different policies along this dimension. At one extreme,
the intermediary can collect and transmit complete (identity-revealing) data about individual
consumers (X = S), thereby enabling the producer to charge personalized prices. At the
other extreme, the intermediary can collect anonymized data (X = A).
Under anonymized information intermediation, the producer charges the same price to all
consumers who participate in the intermediary’s data policy. In other words, from the point
of view of the producer, anonymized data is equivalent to aggregate demand data. These data
still allow the producer to perform third-degree price discrimination across realizations of
the total market demand but limit his ability to extract surplus from individual consumers.6
6More formally, under the anonymized data policy A, the producer has access to the vector δ (s), i.e., to
a uniformly random permutation of the consumers’signals. Because the producer faces a prediction problem
for each wi with a convex loss, he chooses to charge a uniform price that is optimal for the sample average
of the consumers’signals.
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Certainly, for the producer, the value of market demand data is lower than the value
of individual demand data. However, the cost of acquiring such fine-grained data from
consumers is also correspondingly higher. We now show that anonymizing the consumers’
information profitably reduces the intermediary’s data acquisition costs.
Proposition 3 (Optimality of Data Anonymization)
The intermediary obtains strictly greater profits by collecting anonymized consumer data.
Within the confines of our policies, but independent of the distributions of fundamental
and noise terms, the data intermediary finds it advantageous to not elicit the identity of
the consumer. Therefore, the producer will not offer personalized prices but variable prices
that adjust to the realized information about market demand. In other words, a monopolist
intermediary might cause socially ineffi cient information transmission, but the equilibrium
contractual outcome preserves privacy over the personal identity of the consumer.
In Section 5, we explore the boundaries of the anonymization result, under both het-
erogeneous consumers and alternative product-market specifications. In particular, we will
generalize our result to show that anonymization is optimal when consumers are homo-
geneous ex ante and transmitting data to the producer is socially ineffi cient. Therefore,
if information is used to target advertisements, and more precise messages increase social
surplus, then we shall predict that the intermediary shares complete data.7
For the case of surplus extraction (prices), the finding in Proposition 3 suggests why we
might see personalized prices in fewer settings than initially anticipated. In the context of
direct sales of information, for example, Nielsen does not sell individual households’data to
merchants. Instead, Nielsen aggregates its panel data at the local market level. Similarly, in
the context of indirect sales of information, merchants on the retail platform Amazon very
rarely engage in personalized pricing. However, the price of every single good or service is
subject to substantial variation across both geographic markets and over time.
In light of the above result, we might interpret the restraint on the use of personal-
ized pricing as the optimal resolution of the intermediary’s trade-off in acquiring sensitive
consumer information. Stretching the interpretation, the pushback against Amazon’s intro-
duction of personalized pricing in the early 2000s can also be viewed as a tightening the
consumers’participation constraints. Under any degree of competition, the net value of the
Amazon platform under perfect personalized pricing would not have exceeded the consumers’
outside options.
The data externality is, once again, the key to gaining intuition for why the intermediary
chooses data anonymization. Suppose consumers −i reveal their signals, and consumer
7If, in addition, responsiveness to ads is heterogeneous in the consumer population, coarser information
transmission (i.e., not fully anonymous) can also be optimal, as we show in Proposition 9.
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i does not. With access to identifying information, the producer optimally aggregates the
available data to form the best predictor of the missing data point. In this case, the producer
charges a personalized price p∗i (X−i) to each nonparticipating consumer i. With anonymous
data, the producer charges two prices: a single price for all participating consumers and
another price for the deviating, nonparticipating consumers. Because the distribution of
consumer willingness to pay and signals is symmetric, however, the producer’s inference on
wi is invariant to permutations of the other consumers’signals, i.e.,
E [wi | a−i] = E [wi | s−i] .
Therefore, a nonparticipating consumer faces identical prices under both data policies:8
p∗i (S−i) = p
∗
i (A−i) .
Likewise, consumer i’s posterior distribution over her own wi does not depend on the identity
the other consumers. Therefore, removing identity information through the anonymized
policy X = A does not have any implications for consumers’learning either:
E [wi | si, a−i] = E [wi | s] .
Because the amount of information available to consumer i and to the producer off the
path of play is independent of X ∈ {A, S}, it follows that
Ui ((Si, S−i) , S−i) = Ui ((Si, A−i) , A−i) .
In turn, this implies DEi (S) = DEi (A). Thus, the data externality term DEi (X) in the
intermediary’s profits (14) is not impacted by the choice of inflow X ∈ {A, S} .
Along the path of play, however, the two data inflow policies yield different outcomes. In
particular, the anonymized data inflow policy reduces the amount of information conveyed
to the producer in equilibrium. Crucially, this reduction does not occur at the expense of the
consumers’own learning. Therefore, the shift to anonymized data increases the total surplus
terms ∆Wi (X) and the intermediary’s profits. Put differently, anonymization reduces the
cost of procuring the information, relative to the loss in revenue.
We now show that data anonymization is the key to the “explosive” profitability of
8Anonymization remains optimal if we force the producer to charge a single price to all consumers on
and off the equilibrium. With this interpretation, we intend to capture the idea that the producer offers
one price “on the platform”to the participating consumers while interacting with the deviating consumer
“offl ine.”The producer then uses the available market data to tailor the offl ine price.
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data intermediation when the number of consumers becomes large. We then revisit the
applications and limitations of our anonymization result in Section 5.
4.2 Large Markets
Thus far, we have considered the optimal data policy for a given finite number of consumers,
each of whom transmits a single signal. Perhaps, the defining feature of data markets is
the multitude of (potential) participants, data sources, and services. We now pursue the
implications of having many participants (i.e., of many data sources) for the social effi ciency
of data markets and the price of data.
Each additional consumer presents an additional opportunity for trade in the product
market. Thus, the feasible social surplus is linear in the number of consumers. In addition,
with every additional consumer, the intermediary obtains additional information about mar-
ket demand. These two effects suggest that intermediation becomes increasingly profitable
in larger markets, wherein the potential revenue increases without bound, whereas individual
consumers make a small marginal contribution to the precision of aggregate data.
For this comparative statics analysis, we adopt the following additive data structure.
Specifically, we assume the willingness to pay of consumer i is the sum of two components:
wi = θ + θi. (17)
The term θ is common to all consumers in the market, whereas the term θi is idiosyncratic
to consumer i. Similarly, the error term of consumer i is given by
ei , ε+ εi, (18)
where the terms ε and εi refer to a common and an idiosyncratic error, respectively. We also
refer to the willingness to pay wi as the fundamental as opposed to the error term ei.
As we vary the number of consumers N , the additive data structure allows us to hold the
pairwise correlation between any two consumers’fundamentals and noise terms constant. In
particular, let α denote the correlation coeffi cient of any two (wi, wj), and let β denote the
correlation coeffi cient of (ei, ej).
We first establish a suffi cient condition for the profitability of complete data sharing
as the number of consumers becomes large, and then we analyze the data intermediary’s
revenue and total cost separately.
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Proposition 4 (Profitable Intermediation of Anonymized Data)
For any α > 0, there exists N∗ such that anonymized data sharing is profitable if N > N∗.
We already know from Corollary 2 that a high degree of correlation in the consumers’
willingness to pay allows the intermediary to profit from data sharing with suffi ciently precise
signals. Under the optimal data-sharing policy, any degree of correlation in the consumers’
willingness to pay makes the anonymized signals suffi ciently close substitutes that interme-
diation is profitable when N is large.
In Proposition 5, we assume that error terms are independent. This allows us to use the
sample average to establish a lower bound on learning from N − 1 signals. We suspect that
similar results hold more generally under correlated errors.9
Proposition 5 (Large Markets)
Consider the additive data structure and assume that errors are independent across con-
sumers. As N →∞:
1. Each consumer’s compensation m∗i converges to zero.




(var [θi] + var [εi]) , ∀N.
3. The intermediary’s revenue and profit grow linearly in N .
As the optimal data policy aggregates the consumers’signals, each additional consumer
has a rapidly decreasing marginal value. Furthermore, each consumer is paid only for her
marginal contribution; this explains why the total paymentsNmi converge to a finite number.
Strikingly, this convergence can occur from above: when the consumers’willingness to pay
is suffi ciently correlated, the decrease in each i’s marginal contribution can be suffi ciently
strong to offset the increase in N .
Whereas total costs converge to a constant, the revenue that the data intermediary can
extract from the producer is linear in the number of consumers. Our model therefore implies
that, as the market size grows without bound, the per capita profit of the data interme-
diary converges to the per capita profit when the (anonymized) data are freely available.
Conversely, the impact on consumer surplus depends on the degree of correlation in the
underlying fundamentals and on the precision of the consumers’initial signals.10
9This result holds, for example, when both fundamentals and errors have Gaussian distributions.
10In a recent contribution, Loertscher and Marx (2020) study large digital monopoly markets, where data
have the countervailing effects of improving consumer valuations and increasing monopoly prices.
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Finally, we show that data anonymization is crucial for the large N properties of the
intermediary’s profits. Recall that, with complete data intermediation, individual consumer
payments are proportional to G(S)−G(S−i). As long as fundamentals wi are not perfectly
correlated, these payments are then bounded away from zero for any finite N . Proposition
6 shows that this property also holds in the limit.
Proposition 6 (Asymptotics with Complete Sharing)
Consider the additive data structure with var[θi] > 0. Under complete (identity-revealing)









An immediate consequence of Proposition 6 is that, with complete data sharing, total
payments to consumers grow linearly in N . Thus, anonymization is critical to achieving
increasing returns to scale in data intermediation: even in settings where complete data
intermediation X = S is profitable, the per capita profits are bounded away from the full
value of information.
Figure 2 illustrates an example with normally distributed fundamentals and errors, in
which it can be less expensive for the intermediary to acquire a larger anonymized dataset
than a smaller one, but not a larger complete dataset.
Figure 2: Total Consumer Compensation (σw = 1, σe = 0)
4.3 Unique Implementation
Our analysis thus far has characterized the intermediary’s most preferred equilibrium. An
ensuing question is whether the qualitative insights and the asymptotic properties discussed
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above would hold across all equilibria, particularly in the intermediary’s least preferred equi-
librium. A seminal result in the literature on contracting with externalities (see Segal (1999))
is the “divide-and-conquer”scheme that guarantees a unique equilibrium outcome (see Segal
and Whinston (2000) and Miklos-Thal and Shaffer (2016)). Under this scheme, the interme-
diary can sequentially approach consumers and offer compensation conditional on all earlier
consumers having accepted an offer. In this scheme, the first consumer receives compensa-
tion equal to her entire surplus loss, thereby guaranteeing her acceptance regardless of the
other consumers’decisions. More generally, consumer i receives the optimal compensation
level in the baseline equilibrium when N = i.
The cost of acquiring the consumers’data is strictly higher under “divide and conquer”
than in the intermediary’s most preferred equilibrium. Nonetheless, the impact of the en-
suring unique implementation on per capita profits vanishes in the limit.
Proposition 7 (“Divide and Conquer”)
Consider the additive data structure with independent errors. Under the “Divide and Con-




(1 + logN)(var[θi] + var[εi]).
Under divide and conquer, the total payments to the consumers do not converge to a
finite constant as N grows without bound. However, the growth rate of these payments is far
smaller than the rate at which the producer’s willingness to pay for data diverges. Therefore,
regardless of the equilibrium-selection criterion, the intermediary’s per capita profits converge
to the benchmark level when anonymized consumer data are made available.
5 Implications for Consumer Privacy
In this section, we enrich our model along several dimensions to characterize the implications
of the optimal data intermediation policy for consumer privacy. In particular, we consider
richer pricing instruments in the product market, heterogeneous consumers, heterogeneous
product varieties, noisy information collection, and commitment power in the data market.
5.1 Data Anonymization and Social Effi ciency
In our baseline setting, data anonymization is optimal independent of the model parameters,
such as the number of consumers or the distribution of fundamentals and error terms. This
result relies on two crucial assumptions: (i) consumer are homogeneous, by which we mean
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that the distributions of fundamentals w and errors e are symmetric, and (ii) data sharing has
unambiguous welfare effects on product market participants. Indeed, in the model of linear
price discrimination, transmitting Xi anonymously improves consumer and social surplus,
relative to complete data intermediation.
We can generalize this insight to any arbitrary product market interaction beyond the
linear pricing model of the previous section. Proposition 8 generalizes the intuition behind
the optimal anonymization result in Proposition 3: it establishes that social surplus is the
criterion guiding the intermediary’s decision to optimally collect anonymized data.
Proposition 8 (Social Optimality of Data Anonymization)
With homogeneous consumers, anonymized data intermediation is more profitable than com-
plete data intermediation if and only if anonymization increases social surplus.
We note two important aspects of this result. First, it establishes the congruence between
the intermediary private objective and the social welfare with respect to the anonymization
decision only. It does not claim that the equilibrium information flow itself is socially ef-
ficient. Second, the argument does not require any specific feature of the product market
interaction. As the decision between anonymization and de-anonymization pertains precisely
to the marginal value of the private information of i for the prediction of the willingness to
pay wi, intermediary and consumer i can attain a socially effi cient arrangement.
The result has immediate implications for how equilibrium data sharing policies depend
on the nature of the product market interaction. In particular, Proposition 8 allows us to
examine the role of richer pricing instruments. Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris (2015) have
shown that every feasible combination of consumer and producer surplus is consistent with
some form of price discrimination. Proposition 8 shows that, if the producer had the ability
to extract all the expected surplus (given the consumers’information), then the intermediary
would find it more profitable to collect complete, identifying data.
A canonical example where this prediction is relevant is the case of unit demand by the
consumers, where our model would predict the prevalence of perfect price discrimination.
However, to the extent to which consumers have options to retain some surplus ex post, such
as by scaling down their purchase level as in our baseline model, then full surplus extraction
would require the producer to have access to more complex pricing mechanisms.
5.2 Market Segmentation and Data
The assumption of ex ante homogeneity among consumers has enabled us to produce some
of the central implications of social data. A more complete description of consumer de-
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mand should introduce heterogeneity across groups of consumers along characteristics such
as location, demographics, income, and wealth.
We now explore how these additional characteristics influence information policy and
the profits of the data intermediary. To this end, we augment the description of consumer
demand by splitting the population into J homogeneous groups:
wij ∼ Fw,j, ei,j ∼ Fe,j, i = 1, 2, ..., Nj, j = 1, ..., J .
The intermediary’s data inflow policy must now specify whether to anonymize the con-
sumers’ signals across groups and within each group. However, Proposition 8 establishes
that it is always more profitable to anonymize all signals within each group, rather than
revealing the consumers’identities.
Corollary 4 (No Discrimination within Groups)
The data policy that anonymizes all signals within each group j = 1, ..., J and only reveals the
group identity of each consumer i is more profitable than the complete data-sharing policy.
By further specifying the model, we can identify conditions under which the data in-
termediary will collect and transmit group characteristics. By collecting information about
the group characteristics, the intermediary influences the extent of price discrimination. For
example, the intermediary could anonymize all signals across groups, thus forcing the pro-
ducer to offer only a single price. Alternatively, the intermediary could allow the producer
to discriminate between two groups of consumers by recording and transmitting the group
identities. As intuition would suggest, enabling price discrimination across groups not only
allows the intermediary to charge a higher fee to the producer but also increases the com-
pensation owed to consumers.
Proposition 9 below sheds light on the optimal resolution of this trade-off. In this result,
we restrict attention to the case of symmetric groups (Nj = N for all j), with the additive
data structure wi = θ + θi, and independent noise terms in the consumers’signals.
Proposition 9 (Segmentation)
If N is large enough, inducing group-level pricing is more profitable for the intermediary than
inducing uniform pricing.
Whereas Proposition 3 stated that the intermediary will not reveal any information about
consumer identity, Proposition 9 refines that result: if the market is suffi ciently large, then
the intermediary will convey limited identity information, i.e., each consumer’s group iden-
tity. This policy allows the producer to price discriminate across, but not within, groups.
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Conversely, if the producer faces few consumers and their willingness to pay are not highly
correlated, then pooling all signals reduces the cost of sourcing the data.
The limited amount of price discrimination, which operates optimally at the group level
rather than the individual level, can explain the behavior of many platforms. For example,
Uber and Amazon claim that they do not discriminate at the individual level, but they
condition prices on location, time, and other dimensions that capture group characteristics.
The result in Proposition 9 is perhaps the sharpest manifestation of the value of big
data. By enabling the producer to adopt a richer pricing model, a larger database allows the
intermediary to extract more surplus. Our result also clarifies the appetite of the platforms
for large datasets: because having more consumers allows the platform to profitably segment
the market more precisely, the value of the marginal consumer i = N to the intermediary
remains large even as N grows. In other words, allowing the producer to segment the market
is akin to paying a fixed cost (i.e., higher compensation to the current consumers) to access
a better technology (i.e., one that scales more easily with N). Figure 3 illustrates this result
for an example with normally distributed fundamentals and errors.
Figure 3: Marginal Value of an Additional Consumer
The optimality of using a richer pricing model when larger datasets are available is
reminiscent of model selection criteria under overfitting concerns, e.g., the Akaike information
criterion. In our setting, however, the optimality of inducing segmentation is not driven by
econometric considerations. Instead, it is entirely driven by the intermediary’s cost-benefit
analysis in acquiring more precise information from consumers. As the data externality
grows suffi ciently strong, acquiring the data becomes cheaper as the intermediary exploits
the richer structure of consumer demand.11
11Montiel Olea, Ortoleva, Pai, and Prat (2019) offer a demand-side explanation of a similar phenomenon:
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Finally, the welfare ranking of the two pricing schemes (group vs. uniform) is a priori
ambiguous. In particular, group pricing can yield lower total surplus than uniform pricing,
e.g., when consumers know their willingness to pay and group pricing results in ineffi cient
price discrimination. In other words, outside of the conditions of Proposition 8 (e.g., with
heterogeneous consumers), market segmentation can be driven purely by the data externality.
5.3 Recommender System
In our baseline model, the data shared by the intermediary are used by the producer to
set prices and by consumers to learn about their own preferences. The first assumption
is, in a sense, the worst-case scenario for the intermediary: consider the case in which
consumers’initial signals are very precise. As price discrimination reduces total surplus, no
intermediation would be profitable without a strong, negative data externality. Consequently,
data aggregation is an essential part of the optimal data intermediation policy in this case.
In practice, however, consumer data can also be used by the producer in surplus-enhancing
ways, for example, to facilitate targeting quality levels and other product characteristics to
the consumer’s tastes.
In this section, we develop a generalization of our framework; this generalization allows
the producer to charge a unit price pi and to offer a product of characteristic ki to each
consumer. Consumers differ both in their vertical willingness to pay and in their horizontal
taste for the product’s characteristics. Consumer i’s utility function is given by
ui (wi, qi, pi, ki, `i) = (wi − (ki − `i)2 − pi)qi − q2i /2,
with wi denoting the consumer’s willingness to pay and `i denoting the consumer’s ideal
location or product characteristic. Both the willingness to pay w ∈ RN and the locations
` ∈ RN of different consumers are potentially correlated. The producer has a constant
marginal cost of quantity provision that we normalize to zero and can freely set the product’s
characteristic. Therefore, the case of a common location `i ≡ ` for all consumers yields the
baseline model of price discrimination.
We examine the data intermediary’s optimal data inflow policy, which allows for separate
aggregation policies for willingness to pay and location information. We impose the following
assumptions: (i) the gains from trade under no information sharing are suffi ciently large;
(ii) the consumers’ fundamentals have a joint Gaussian distribution; and (iii) consumer i
perfectly observes (wi, `i). The extension to noisy Gaussian signals is immediate. We then
obtain another application of Proposition 8.
they showed that data buyers who employ a richer pricing model are willing to pay more for larger datasets.
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Proposition 10 (Optimal Aggregation by a Recommender System)
The intermediary’s optimal policy collects anonymized data on the vertical component wi and
complete data on the horizontal component `i.
Therefore, the recommender system enables the producer to offer targeted product char-
acteristics that match ki to `i as closely as possible. However, the system does not allow for
personalized pricing. The logic is once again given by the intermediary’s sources of profits,
i.e., the contribution to social welfare ∆W and the data externality DE. Because the data
externalities do not depend on the level of data anonymization, the intermediary chooses
to aggregate the vertical dimension of consumer data, thereby reducing the total surplus if
transmitted to the producer. Conversely, because the distance between a consumer’s ideal
product and the firm’s offer (ki − `i)2 shifts the consumer’s demand function down, the
intermediary allows for the personalization of product characteristics.
5.4 Intermediary with Commitment
We have assumed thus far that the intermediary cannot refrain from selling information
to the producer and cannot sell any acquired data inflow back to the consumers. The
latter assumption entails no loss: consumers know that the intermediary sells the data to
the producer, and therefore expect to receive all available information regardless of their
participation decisions (Proposition 1), because they know that revealing this information
maximizes the producer’s fee.
The no commitment assumption reflects the substantial control that large online plat-
forms have over the use of the data and the opacity with which the data outflow is linked to
the data inflow. In other words, it is diffi cult to ascertain how any given data input informs
an intermediary’s data output. Nonetheless, it is useful to consider the implications of the
data intermediary’s ability to commit to a certain data policy, especially in light of the wel-
fare properties of data sharing discussed above. To that end, suppose the data intermediary
offered the consumers contracts that specify a data inflow and a data outflow policy.
Through richer contracts, the data intermediary can offer consumers privacy guarantees.
In particular, the intermediary can implement the socially effi cient data-sharing policy, which
consists of sharing all signals among all the consumers who accept the contract and not
sharing any data at all with the producer (Corollary 1). In exchange for this commitment,
the data intermediary requests compensation from the consumers. In turn, consumers are
willing to pay a positive price for these data, and hence the socially optimal data sharing is
always profitable.12
12This environment with commitment is related to the analysis in Lizzeri (1999) but has a number of
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However, the equilibrium outcome under these stronger commitment assumptions fails
to capture the role of large online platforms. Even though there are examples in which
consumers pay a positive price to access tailored, non-sponsored recommendations, data in-
termediaries choose to monetize the producers’side of their platform much more frequently.
Moreover, the socially effi cient policy need not maximize the intermediary’s profits. For
example, if fundamentals are perfectly correlated and signals are arbitrarily precise, the
intermediary’s profits from the first-best policy are nil. Under these conditions, an inter-
mediary with commitment (or even an intermediary who sells its own products) would not
monetize their information by selling it to consumers.
It is beyond the scope of this article to characterize the optimal commitment policy
for any initial data structure, but the data externality clearly remains a key driver of the
equilibrium allocation of information even under stronger commitment assumptions.
6 Conclusion
We have explored the trading of information between data intermediaries with market power
and multiple consumers with correlated preferences. The data externality that we have
uncovered strongly suggests that levels of compensation close to zero can induce an individual
consumer in a large market to relinquish precise information about her preferences. This
finding holds even if the consumer’s data are later sold to a firm that seeks to extract their
surplus. Thus, giving consumers control rights over their data (a pillar of privacy regulation
such as the EU General Data Protection Regulation or the California Privacy Rights Act)
is insuffi cient to bring about the effi cient use of information.
Our results regarding the aggregation of consumer information further suggest that pri-
vacy regulations must move away from concerns over personalized prices at the individual
level. Most often, firms do not set prices in response to individual-level characteristics. In-
stead, segmentation of consumers occurs at the group level (e.g., as in the case of Uber)
or at the temporal and spatial levels (e.g., as in the case of Staples and Amazon). Thus,
our analysis points to the significant welfare effects of group-level and market-level, dynamic
prices that react in real time to changes in demand.
A possible mitigator of the consequences of data externalities– echoed in Posner andWeyl
(2018)– consists of facilitating the formation of consumer groups or unions to internalize
distinct features. First, in Lizzeri (1999), the private information is held by a single agent, and multiple
downstream firms compete for the information and for the object offered by the agent. Second, the privately
informed agent enters the contract after she has observed her private information. The shared insight is
that the intermediary with commitment power might be able to extract a rent without any influence on the
effi ciency of the allocation.
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the data externality when bargaining with powerful intermediaries, such as large online
platforms.13 A different regulatory solution is based on privacy managers, such as internet
browsers with heterogeneous privacy settings that compete for consumers’default choice. Yet
another solution– suggested by Romer (2019)– consists of making the data outflow costly
for the intermediary by, for example, taxing targeted advertising. In our model, taxing
the data outflow will limit effi cient and ineffi cient intermediation alike but will affect the
intermediary’s choice of data policy under the assumptions of Section 5.4.
Finally, our data intermediary collected and redistributed the consumer data but played
no role in the interaction between the consumers and the producer. In contrast, a consumer
can often access a given producer only through a data platform.14 Many platforms can then
be thought of as auctioning access to the consumer. The data platform provides the bidding
producers with additional information that they can use to tailor their interactions with
consumers. Social data platforms thus trade individual consumer information for services
rather than money. In these markets, the data externality manifests itself in the quality of
the services offered and in the extent of the consumers’engagement.
13This result echoes the claim in Zuboff (2019) that “privacy is a public issue.”
14Product data platforms, such as Amazon, Uber and Lyft, acquire individual data from the consumer
through the consumers’ purchase of services and products. Social data platforms, such as Google and
Facebook, offer data services to individual users and sell the information to third parties, who mostly
purchase the information in the form of targeted advertising space. In terms of our model, a product data
platform combines the roles of data intermediation and product pricing.
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7 Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1. Under an arbitrary data-inflow policy X, each consumer i observes
a noisy signal Si of her own willingness to pay and sends a potentially noisier signal Xi to
the intermediary.15 Consumer i observes both Si and Xi. Given the data inflow X, the
intermediary chooses an outflow policy, namely, the signal Y0 = Y0(X) sent to the producer
and the signal Yi = Yi(X) sent to each consumer i. The intermediary then chooses a policy
Y that maximizes the producer’s ex ante expected payoff, which it fully extracts through
the fee m0. We let the intermediary selects their favorite equilibrium in the ensuing game.
For any outflow policy Y = (Y0, Yi), denote an induced signaling equilibrium as γ̄ =
(q̄i, p̄), where p̄ : Y0 → R+ is the pricing strategy of the producer and q̄i : Yi×Si×Xi×R+ →
R+ is the demand function of consumer i. We first argue that there exists an equilibrium γ∗
under the outflow policy (p̄◦Y0, (Yi, p̄◦Y0)) that yields a weakly higher ex ante payoff for the
producer. In this new outflow policy, instead of revealing Y0 to the producer, the intermediary
directly recommends the price p̄(Y ) which coincides with the equilibrium pricing strategy in
γ̄, and reveals to consumer i both Yi and the price recommendation.
On the equilibrium path of γ̄, consumer i updates her posterior µ(Yi, Si, p̄i(Y )) using Yi,
her own private signal Si, the reportXi, and the observed price pi. We denote the consumer’s
demand as a function of her posterior beliefs and the price as
qi(µ(Yi, Si, Xi, pi), pi).
The ex ante profit of the producer from consumer i is given by
E [p̄iqi(µ(Yi, Si, Xi, p̄i), p̄i)] .
Now consider the new outflow policy (p̄ ◦ Y0, (Yi, p̄ ◦ Y0)). Under this policy, there exists
an equilibrium where consumer i forms her demand using the data outflow (Yi, p∗ ◦ Y0) from
the intermediary as well as her own signal Si and the data inflow Xi. Because consumer
i knows everything that the producer knows, the price charged by the producer no longer
influences the consumer’s posterior, which therefore coincides with the on-path beliefs in the
original equilibrium γ̄, i.e.,
µ(Yi, Si, Xi, p̄i(Y0)).
Knowing this, the producer maximizes his ex ante payoff by choosing a pricing strategy p̂(·)
15Under complete data sharing, for example, the consumer either reports Xi = Si or refuses to participate,
so that Xi has infinite variance (or the corresponding σ-algebra is the empty set).
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Clearly “following the intermediary’s recommendation,” i.e., setting p̂(p) = p is a feasible
strategy that yields the same payoffas in the old equilibrium γ̄. Consequently, the producer’s
equilibrium payoff is weakly higher than in γ̄.
Proof of Proposition 1. For any offered price pi, consumer i demands the quantity
qi = E[wi|(Si, Yi)]− pi.





Recall that the consumer always has superior information so that Y0 is measurable with
respect to Yi. The profit of the producer is given by



















where the outside expectation represents integration over the whole probability space. The
expected consumer surplus is given by

































Finally, the impact on total surplus is given by the sum of the two effects:
Wi ((Si, Yi), Y0)−Wi (Si,∅) =
1
2




which completes the proof.
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Proof of Proposition 2. By Lemma 1, it is without loss of generality to assume
the producer receives a signal Y, and the consumer receives a signal (Yi, Y ). Thus, we can
focus on equilibria where prices have no signaling effect. These equilibria coincide with those














var[E[wi|Y ]] + E[wi]2
4
.
Therefore it is optimal to maximize var[E[wi|Y ]], which is achieved by setting Y = X.
Hence, the intermediary reveals all information collected (Y = X) both to the producer and
to consumer i.
Proof of Corollary 2. When fundamentals wi are perfectly correlated,
E[wi|S] = E[θ|S] = E[θ|S1, ..., SN ],
E[wi|S−i] = E[θ|S−i],
varE[θ|S−i] = varE[θ|S1, ..., SN−1].
Under our symmetry assumption, the variance of the posterior expectation of the common
willingness to pay var[E[θ|S1,..,N ]] can be written as a function of N . Now we argue that
var[E[θ|S1,..,N ]] is increasing in N . We first define g(S1,...,N−1) , E[θ|S1,..,N−1]. Then, accord-
ing to Lemma 3 below, we have
var[E[θ|S1,..,N ]] = max
f∈L2
[θ]− E[(θ − g(S1,...,N))2],
≥ max
f∈L2
var[θ]− E[(θ − g(S1,...,N−1))2],
= var[E[θ|S1,..,N−1]].


















In the limit for N →∞, the data externality and the consumer surplus are given by
lim
N→∞









































Therefore, when the initial noise is suffi ciently small (i.e., when var[E[wi|Si]] is close to
var[wi]), the data externality is negative and data sharing hurts consumers.
Proof of Corollary 3. Because wi is independent from the other consumers’signals,
we have var[E[wi|S−i]] = 0. Thus, intermediation is always unprofitable, and the data







(var[E[wi|S]]− var[E[wi|Si]] ≥ 0.
Finally, for the results on consumer surplus, we turn to Lemma 3. In particular, we know
var[E[wi|S]] = var[wi]− E[(wi − E[wi|S])2],
≥ var[wi]− E[(wi − (si −
1
N − 1Σj 6=isj))
2],
= var[θi]− E[(θi − (θi + ε−
1




N − 1Σj 6=iθj)
2] =
N − 2











When σ is suffi ciently large, so that var[E[wi|Si]] is close to 0, intermediation increases
consumer surplus.
The proof of Proposition 2 follows from expressions (15) and (16) in the text.
Proof of Proposition 3. In the main text, the data inflow from consumer i is
given by Xi = Si (under complete sharing) and we compare it with X∗i = δ (Si) (under
anonymization). Note that (Si, Xi)i in this case is symmetrically distributed, i.e., its joint
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density is unchanged under permutations of indices. Here we prove a slightly more general
version of the result by allowing an arbitrary information inflow X such that (Si, Xi)i is
symmetrically distributed.16 This assumption is needed because information set (Si, Xi, X∗−i)
and (Si, Xi, X∗) are equivalent by construction, but (Si, X∗−i) and (Si, X
∗) maybe not. Note
that when we restrict to the less general case (when Xi = Si), the latter holds automatically,
so we do not need this assumption.
For any fixed inflow policy X, we refer to p−i as the off-path price charged to consumer i
when she does not accept the intermediary’s contract, and to pi as the on-path price charged
to consumer i. Now consider another inflow policy X∗ identical to X up to a random
permutation of the consumers’identities. Under this scheme, we refer to p∗−i as the off-path
price for consumer i, and to p∗i as the on-path price for consumer i.
We first argue that p−i = p∗−i for any realization of W,S,X. To do so, let us calculate
consumer i’s posterior aboutWi under each inflow policy. Under the non-anonymized scheme,
the posterior distribution of consumer i’s willingness to pay is given by
fi(Wi = wi|Si = si, Xi = xi, X = x)
=
∫
f(Wi = wi,W−i = w
′
−i, Si = si, S−i = s
′









Recall from Proposition 2 that the intermediary’s optimal data outflow policy consists
of revealing to the consumers all the available information, even if the consumer refuses to
participate. When the data is anonymized, because consumer i knows her own report Xi, the
data outflow reveals to her the vector of reports X−i without knowing who generated each
one. We now define δ ∈ Sn−1 as permutation of consumer indices. Consumer i’s posterior
distribution over her willingness to pay wi is now given by
fi(Wi = wi|Si = si, Xi = xi, X∗−i = x−i),
which can be rewritten as









Σδ∈Sn−1 Pr(δ,Wi = wi, Si = si, Xi = xi, X−i = xδ(−i))
Σδ∈Sn−1 Pr(δ, Si = si, Xi = xi, X−i = xδ(−i))
=
Σδ∈Sn−1 Pr(δ) Pr(Wi = wi, Si = si, Xi = xi, X−i = xδ(−i))
Σδ∈Sn−1 Pr(δ)Pr(Si = si, Xi = xi, X−i = xδ(−i))
.
16For example, in Section 7 Xi might be a noisier signal of Si.
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Because of the symmetry assumption, we know that
Pr(Wi = wi, Si = si, Xi = xi, X−i = xδ(−i))
=
∫
f(Wi = wi,W−i = w
′
−i, Si = si, S−i = s
′







f(Wi = wi,W−i = w
′
δ−1(−i), Si = si, S−i = s
′







f(Wi = wi,W−i = w
′
δ−1(−i), Si = si, S−i = s
′





= Pr(Wi = wi, Si = si, Xi = xi, X−i = x−i).
For the same reason, we also have
Pr(Si = si, Xi = xi, X−i = xδ(−i)) = Pr(Si = si, Xi = xi, X−i = x−i).
Thus the posterior of consumer i can be simplified as:
fi(Wi = wi|Si = si, Xi = xi, X∗−i = x−i)
=
Σδ∈Sn−1 Pr(δ) Pr(δ,Wi = wi, Si = si, Xi = xi, X−i = x−i)




|Sn−1| Pr(δ,Wi = wi, Si = si, Xi = xi, X−i = x−i)
Σδ∈Sn−1
1
|Sn−1| Pr(Si = si, Xi = xi, X−i = x−i)
= fi(Wi = wi|Si = si, Xi = xi, X∗−i = x−i).
We have therefore proved that consumer i has the same posterior about her willingness to
pay wi for any realization ofW,S,X irrespective of whether the data are anonymized of not.
Furthermore, this holds both on and off the path of play.
Next, we show that the producer also has the same posterior aboutWi for any realization
of W,S,X when consumer i refuses to report. Under the non-anonymized scheme, the
posterior density is given by:
fi(Wi = wi|X = x) =
∫
f(Wi = wi,W−i = w
′
−i, S = s
′, Xi = xi, X−i = x−i)ds′dw′−i∫
f(W = w′, S = s′, X = xi, X−i = x−i)ds′dw′
.
Under the anonymized scheme, the posterior density is given by
fi(Wi = wi|X∗ = x) =
Σδ∈Sn−1 Pr(δ) Pr(Wi = wi, X = δ(x))
Σδ∈Sn−1 Pr(δ) Pr(X = δ(x))
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By the earlier argument, we can simplify it as follows:
Σδ∈Sn−1 Pr(δ) Pr(Wi = wi, X = x)
Σδ∈Sn−1 Pr(δ) Pr(X = x)
= fi(Wi = wi|X = x)
Because the posteriors for both parties are the same for any realization, so is the price, and
hence the welfare impact of information
The profit of the intermediary from consumer i’s data under inflow policy X is given by
Ri (X) = Π(X,X)− Π(Si,∅)− Ui((Si, X−i), X−i) + Ui((Si, X), X).
We have argued that consumer surplus off the path is the same:
Ui((Si, X−i), X−i) = Ui((Si, X−i), X
∗
−i).
We now turn to the last term– the impact on social welfare on the path of play:

















Recall that consumer i has the same on path posterior under two different scheme. Therefore,



















Therefore, anonymization is more profitable than complete sharing, and strictly so whenever
anonymization makes the estimation less precise.
In the remainder of the Appendix, we often make use of the following classical result in
statistics, which we state as a lemma without proof– the result is an immediate consequence
of the fact that E[X|Y ] is the projection of X on F(Y ) in L2 space.
Lemma 3 Let W and Y be two random variables. Then it holds that
var[E[W |Y ]] = var[W ]− E[(W − E[W |Y ])2] ≤ var[W ],
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and
E[(W − E[W |Y ])2] ≤ E[(W − f(Y ))2], ∀f ∈ L2.
To prove Proposition 4, we first state a basic property of anonymized data sharing in our
symmetric environment.
Lemma 4 When the data is anonymized, the following holds:
E[wi|A] = E[wj|A].
Proof of Lemma 4. Denote the joint distribution of W and S as f(W = w, S = s)
and the posterior of Wi after observing A as f(Wi = w|A). Denote the permutation in SN
as ν and especially the swapping between i and j as νij. For notational simplicity, we use
Pr to denote both probability and the proper marginal density.
fi(Wi = wi|A = s) =
Pr(Wi = wi, A = s)
Pr(A = s)
=







f(Wi = wi,Wj = wj,W−ij = w−ij, Sν = s)dwjdw−ij
Pr(A = s)
.
Because f is unchanged under permutation, we can apply the following transformation:













f(Wj = wi,Wi = w
′




= fj(Wj = wi|A = s).




which completes the proof.








G(A) = var[E[θ +
1
N



















= E[(θ − E[θ|A])2 + 1
N2
(Σiθi − ΣiE[θi|A])2 −
2
N
(θ − E[θ|A])(Σiθi − ΣiE[θi|A])]
≥ E[(θ − E[θ|A])2]− 2
N
√
var[θ − E[θ|A]] var[Σiθi − ΣiE[θi|A]]




where the last inequality comes from Lemma 3. The intermediary’s profit can be written as
R = 3G(A−i)−G(A),
= 3 var[E[θ|A−i]]− var[θ]−
1
N
var[θi] + E[(θ +
1
N




≥ 3 var[E[θ|A−i]]− var[θ]−
1
N





= 3 var[E[θ|A−i]]− var[θ]−
1
N
var[θi] + E[(θ +
1
N












Therefore, in the limit we have:
lim
N→∞
R = 2 lim
N→∞
var[E[θ|A]] > 0,
which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5. We first prove that the total compensation is bounded from
above, which immediately implies that the individual compensation goes to 0 as N → ∞.
From Lemma 4, we know that











On the other hand, we also know
G(A−i) = var[E[θ|A−i]] = var[θ]− E[(θ − E[θ|A−i])2].
Because the conditional expectation is the best L2 approximation, we know it leads to a
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− var[θ] + 1









N − 1(var[θi] + var[εi])
)
≤ 3(var[θi] + var[εi]).
























which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 6. When data is not anonymized we have:
G(S)−G(S−i) = var[E[θ + θi|S]]− var[E[θ|S−i]].
Because of symmetry, we have
cov[E[θ|S],E[θi|S]] = cov[E[θ|S],E[θj|S]] = cov[E[θ|S],ΣNj=1E[θj/N |S ]].
Because the correlation coeffi cient is always greater than −1, we obtain
cov[E[θ|S],ΣNj=1E[θj/N |S ]] ≥ −
√





Therefore, according to Lemma 3 we have:
G(S)−G(S−i) = var[E[θ|S]] + 2 cov[E[θ|S],E[θi|S]] + var[E[θi|S]]− var[E[θ|S−i]]
≥ var[E[θ|S]]− 2 1√
N
√





The last term is strictly positive because
var[E[θi|S]] = var[θi]− E[(θi − E[θi|S])2]
≥ var[θi]− E[(θi −
var[θi]









var[θi] + var[θ] + var[e]
> 0,
where the first inequality again uses Lemma 3.
Proof of Proposition 7. In the standard “divide and conquer”scheme, the compen-
sation for the i-th consumer is the marginal loss of revealing her information given that i−1







Because in general we do not know whether this marginal loss is decreasing in i, we consider









Under this payment scheme, it is a dominant strategy for consumer 1 to accept the offer.
Moreover, it is optimal for consumer i to accept the offer, given that the first i−1 consumers


















i− 1(var[θi] + var[εi]).
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i− 1(var[θi] + var[εi]).









i− 1)(var[θi] + var[εi]),
≤ 3
4
(1 + logN)(var[θi] + var[εi]),
the total compensation grows at a speed less than logN .
Proof of Proposition 8. The proof of this proposition is similar to that of Proposi-
tion 3. By Lemma 1, we know that the intermediary will transmit whatever information it
collected to all consumers. By homogeneity, we know the consumer’s posterior about their
own fundamental wij is the same whether the signals are anonymized or not, and the pro-
ducer’s posterior about any deviating consumer’s fundamental is also the same under the
two schemes.
Denote the broker’s revenue under the non-anonymized and anonymized scheme as R(X)
and R(X∗), respectively. It then holds that
Ri (X) = Π(X,X)− Π(Si,∅)− Ui((Si, X−i), X−i) + Ui((Si, X), X),
Ri (X
∗) = Π(X∗, X∗)− Π(Si,∅)− Ui((Si, X∗−i), X∗−i) + Ui((Si, X∗), X∗).
Our analysis in previous paragraph implies





Therefore the intermediary prefers anonymization if and only if
Ri(X
∗)−Ri(X) = W ((Si, X∗), X∗)−W ((Si, X), X) ≥ 0,
which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 9. We first consider the case where the intermediary anonymizes
all data, including the group identities. Similar to the result in Lemma 4, we know that the
producer offers one price to all consumers on the path of play,
E[wij|A] = E[wi′j′ |A].
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Next, consider the case where the intermediary reveals the group identity. Instead of A we
use Ag to denote the information that the producer receives. By an argument similar to the



















When consumer ij rejects the offer, the intermediary will know the group identity of this
deviating consumer and use all the available data to estimate the demand:










































From Lemma 3, we know



























































































The dominant linear term is decreasing in Nj, and hence we know that as Nj →∞, revealing
group identities is more profitable.
Proof of Proposition 10. Each consumer’s demand function is given by
qi = wi − (`i − xi)2 − pi.










Therefore, under any information structure S, the producer offers
pi =
(
E [wi | S]− E
[





E [wi | S]− E
[
(`i − E [`i | S])2
])
/2,
xi = E [`i | S] ,
where the second line relies on the fact that the underlying random variables are normal so
that `i − E[`i|S] is independent of S.
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]
.
Therefore the difference is:
Ui(S)− Ui(∅) = −
3
8
var [E [wi | S]] +
1
4





















(`i − µτ )
2]2 .
Because every random variable is assumed to be normal, `i−E[`i|S] is also normal with zero
mean. We can further simplify and obtain
Ui(S)− Ui(∅) = −
3
8
var [E [wi | S]] +
1
4
µ var [E [`i | S]] +
3
2
([`i]− var [E [`i | S]])2
− 3
8
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E [wi | S]2 − 2E [wi | S]E
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var[E [wi | S]] +
1
2





var [E [`i | S]]2 − 2 var [E [`i | S]] (σ2τ + σ2τ i)
)
.
To summarize, the impact of data sharing on social surplus is given by
Wi(S)−Wi(∅) = Ui(S)− Ui(∅) + Πi(S)− Πi(∅),
= −1
8
var [E [wi | S]] +
3
4




var [E [`i | S]]2 − 2 var [E [`i | S]] (σ2τ + σ2τ i)
)
.
Therefore the difference Wi(S)−Wi(∅) is a quadratic function of the variance of the condi-















As long as 3µ > 11(σ2τ + σ
2
τ i
), this function is positive and increasing in x, which means a
higher var[E[`i|S]] increases consumer surplus.
Finally, as in the proof of Proposition 3, aggregating wi increases Wi(S) but keeps Π(∅)
and Ui(S−i) unchanged. Not aggregating `i increasesWi(S) while keeping Π(∅) and Ui(S−i)
unchanged. Therefore it is optimal for the intermediary to aggregate wi but not `i.
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Appendix B
In this Appendix, we explore the data intermediary’s ability to offer privacy guarantees in
equilibrium by collecting less than perfect information about the consumers’signals. Specifi-
cally, we consider the additive data structure in (17)-(18) and again assume that fundamental
and error terms have a joint Gaussian distribution. We then specify a class of data policies
that add common and idiosyncratic noise terms ξ and ξi to the consumers’original (noisy)
signals si. We then have the following data inflow,
xi = wi + σei︸ ︷︷ ︸
=si
+ ξ + ξi,




Proposition 11 (Optimal Noise Structure)
1. The optimal data inflow policy adds no idiosyncratic noise; i.e., σ∗ξi = 0.
2. The optimal data inflow policy adds (weakly) positive aggregate noise; i.e., σ∗ξ ≥ 0.
Proof of Proposition 11. Recall the formula in the proof of Proposition 1,
Πi(Yi, Y ) =
var[E[wi|Y ]] + µ2
4
,







With a noisier report X, consumer i will know Si and X both on path and off path. The





















Xi = wi + σei + ξ + ξi = θ + θi + (σεi + ξi) + (σε+ ξ).
For ease of exposition, we rewrite (σεi+ξi) as εi and (σε+ξ) as ε. Because the intermediary
can control the variance of ξ, ξi but not the initial precision of the consumers’signals, we
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effectively have a lower bound of the variance σ2i and σ
2 on the new pair εi, ε. Denote the


































Now we are ready to prove the theorem. We argue it is optimal to set σ2εi = σ
2
i (i.e., to
set σ2ξi = 0 ). To show this result, suppose σ
2
εi
> σ2i . Then there exists δ > 0 such that
augmenting the common noise to σ̄2ε , σ2ε + δ2 and diminishing the idiosyncratic noise to
σ̄2εi , σ2εi − (N − 1)δ
2 ≥ σ2i , the profits of the intermediary will strictly increase. Too see
this, consider the expression of the revenue
R (S) =
3(N − 1)Nσ4θ













The first term is unchanged under the new information structure, whereas the denominator
of the second term increases; thus, the total profit increases.
As we establish in Proposition 12, no profitable intermediation is feasible for values of α
less than a threshold that decreases with N . This threshold is independent of the correlation
coeffi cient β of the initial noise terms (ei, ej). Furthermore, as α approaches this threshold
from above, the optimal level of common noise grows without bound. Figure 4 shows the
optimal variance in the additional common noise term.
Proposition 12 (Profitability of Data Intermediation)




3 + 1)− 1
2N (N + 1)− 1 ∈ (0, 1) .
Proof of Proposition 12. Recall that α is the correlation coeffi cient between wi and
wj. Because we have normalized var [wi] = 1, under the additive structure, we have σ2θ = α
and σ2θi = 1 − α. To establish the result in the statement, we must then show that the





σ2θ − σ2θi > 0.
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+ nσ2θ + σ
2
θi
)(σ2εn− σ2ε + σ2εi + nσ2θ − σ2θ + σ2θi)
,
A = (n− 1)
(





Therefore the intermediary can obtain a positive profit R by setting σ2ε suffi ciently large
through the addition of correlated noise.
The optimal level of common noise σ∗ξ is strictly positive when the number of consumers
N or the correlation in their willingness to pay α is suffi ciently small: if the consumers’
preferences are suffi ciently correlated, or if the market is suffi ciently large, the intermediary
does not add any noise. If the consumers’fundamentals are not suffi ciently correlated, the
intermediary makes their signals more correlated with additional common noise σ∗ξ .
The additional noise reduces the amount of information procured from consumers and
hence the total compensation owed to them. These cost savings come at the expense of lower
revenues. In this respect, aggregation and noise serve a common purpose. However, because
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the intermediary optimally anonymizes the consumers’signals, the correlation in the supple-
mental noise terms ξ renders signal si less valuable on the margin for estimating the average
willingness to pay w̄. In other words, the aggregate demand information without consumer
i’s signal si is a relatively better predictor of w̄ when the intermediary uses common rather
than idiosyncratic noise. Therefore, by using common noise exclusively, the intermediary
can hold the information sold to the producer constant while reducing the cost of acquiring
that information from consumers.
Finally, note that these two elements of information design– aggregation and noise–
interact richly with one another. In particular, the value of common noise is deeply linked to
that of aggregate data: if the intermediary is restricted to complete (identity-revealing) data
sharing, one can show that supplemental idiosyncratic noise is optimal when the consumers’
initial signals si are suffi ciently precise.
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